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ABSTRACT
Today, populism has gradually become one of the most talked about, most
studied phenomena, both within and beyond academia. Most studies of
populism focus on its conceptualisation, operationalisation, measurement or
its outcomes. However, adding to the growing empirical analysis of populism,
we propose to study populism as a regional-level phenomenon and explain
regional patterns of variation in the populist demand. To do so, we develop a
series of theoretical arguments from, which we subsequently test empirically.
Speciﬁcally, we argue that higher levels of regional populism demand are
associated with (i) economic hardship, (ii) strong institutional autonomy, (iii)
strong territorial identity, and (iv) greater distance to elites. We construct a
populist index for 143 regions across nine countries and combine this with a
unique and rich regional database. While we ﬁnd that populism holds distinct
regional patterns and there is support for classic predictors like economic
hardship, we are also able to provide some unique insights into the regional
foundations of populism, most notably the predictive power of regional
identity and the distance to national elites.
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Introduction
Populism has become an intricate and consistent part of both American
and European democracies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).
Recently, this has been exempliﬁed by the success of populist parties in
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the 2014 EP elections, the presidential election in the USA and the Brexit
referendum in the UK. While scholars continue to provide contributions
regarding its conceptualisation (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Aslani-
dis 2015; Moﬃtt and Tormey 2014; Mudde 2004; Weyland 2001), its
theoretical framework (Albertazzi 2008; Mény and Surel 2000, 2002; Roo-
duijn 2014; Stanley 2008; Taggart 2000, 2002), its measurement (Hawkins
2009; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn and Pauwels
2011), its role in party development (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart
2007; Mény and Surel 2002; van Kessel 2015) and its eﬀect on diﬀerent
aspects of [liberal] democracy (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; 2018), recent studies also shift their analytical
focus towards the populist breeding ground or - diﬀerently put - the popu-
list potential available for mobilisation (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2014; Akker-
man et al. 2017; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Hawkins and Riding 2010;
Stanley 2011, 2018; Jacobs. et al. 2018; Hawkins et al. 2018a; Van Hau-
waert and van Kessel 2018). Our study looks to complement this particu-
lar interpretation of populism in several ways.
Mostly, the literature describes such demand-side populism as a ubiqui-
tous and pervasive phenomenon with elevated and systemic levels. We
can identify four crucial caveats. First, evidence of populist aptitude comes
mostly from single-country perspectives, like in the Netherlands, Slovakia
and the USA. Second, most studies remain theoretical. Third, while the exist-
ing literature frequently refers to ‘crisis’ to explain the variance in populist
potential, it overlooks some alternative mechanisms. Fourth, existing
studies assume that populist demand is widespread, but systematically
undervalue patterns of variation within countries. They often consider a
broad and harmonised populist potential, rather than to recognise lower-
level patterns of variance in this potential. For example, we can observe sub-
stantial diﬀerences in populism between Eastern and Western Germany, as
well as between capital and peripheral regions in Spain and the UK.
With these caveats in mind, we formulate the following research ques-
tions: (i) to what extent do we ﬁnd empirical support for a widespread
and harmonised populist potential, (ii) to what extent can we observe
between- and within-country patterns of variance in such populist potential,
and (iii) if such patterns exist, what correlates can help us shed some light on
them? In essence, rather than investigating the variance between individuals,
this study primarily focuses on a more aggregated expression of populist
demand. Diﬀerently put, the central purpose of this study is explorative
and, more speciﬁcally, to evaluate the populist potential across European
regions, thereby complementing an increasing number of studies that
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focus exclusively on individual-level diﬀerences in populism (Mélendez and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018).
To this end, we use cross-sectional data from nine countries to develop an
index of populist demand (potential) for 143 separate regions. In a ﬁrst step,
we descriptively examine noticeable within-country (regional) patterns of
variance. In a second step, we explore the relationship with a set of proposed
correlates of regional-level expressions of populist potential, mainly focusing
on economic and regional identity variables. While such an analytical frame-
work is typically formulated on the national level, we theorise this latter set of
variables to have a unique regional-level contribution, thereby simul-
taneously proposing a novel regional-level approach to the study of (patterns
in) populist potential. Combined, this allows us to formulate an exploratory
account of regional-level populist potential and provide some provisional
insights into its within-country patterns of variance. In a ﬁnal step, we
reﬂect on these ﬁndings, their implications for the empirical study of
(demand-side) populism, and where their restrictions lie.
Populism as a demand-side phenomenon
Despite some remaining diﬀerences, most scholars converge around a
shared conceptual understanding of populism as ‘a speciﬁc set of ideas’
(Hawkins 2009; Hawkins et al. 2018b). This ‘ideational’ approach allows
for the analysis of diﬀerent expressions of populism and the speciﬁcation
of the various key concepts that harmonise these ideas. Throughout this
study, we limit our analysis to one such expression, namely populism as
a thin centred ideology. More precisely, we deﬁne populism as
(…) an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two hom-
ogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and
which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale
(general will) of the people.1 (Mudde 2004: 543)
The three essential components of populism are the sovereignty of the
people, the opposition to an elite, and a Manichean division of the
world (Hawkins et al. 2018b).
While there is a growing amount of public debate and academic
research on populism, both primarily focus on providing insights into
the supply-side of populism. For example, recent studies focus on populist
1The ‘thin-centred’ part indicates that populism provides some "individually shaped coat hangers" other
ideologies can use to build on Freeden (1997: 5), while it simultaneously promotes some degree of
abstractness that proves rather beneﬁcial for cross-contextual comparisons (cf. Sartori 1970).
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leaders (Hawkins 2003, 2009, 2010; Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2018),
populist parties (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; van Kessel 2015), the
relationship between populism and democracy (Huber and Schimpf
2016, 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 2018; Müller 2016) and
populism in government (Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Wear
2008). Typically, these supply-side interpretations of populism mainly
focus on organisational and institutional aspects of politics.
At the same time, there is a consensus amongst scholars that the supply-
side cannot be successful without a strong demand-side (both interact).
Only a few studies have investigated the origins of varying support for popu-
lism at the individual level (cf. Spruyt et al. 2016), or how supply and (popu-
list) demand interact and inﬂuence the success of populist parties (Mélendez
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017; Rooduijn 2018;
Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018). Seeing that the demand-side remains
understudied, this paper focuses on the former aspect. To supplement
initial studies of populist demand at the individual level, we examine the
nature of the phenomenon on the regional level (cf. supra). That is, we are
interested in the regional diﬀerences in populist potential, which we conceive
of as the extent to which the population of a certain region can bemobilised or
exploited by (populist) actors based onmoral anti-elite and general will senti-
ments. Some studies do address this and almost unanimously suggest a popu-
list potential exists in both Europe (Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018) and
the Americas (Hawkins and Riding 2010; Mélendez and Rovira Kaltwasser
2017).2 Most studies take a national-level outlook, but some do go beyond
this and identify patterns at the supra-national or continental level (Kenny
2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser
2015; Hawkins et al. 2018b).
While these initial empirical studies provide insights into the general state
of populism as a demand-side phenomenon, they primarily focus on the
individual-level expressions of populism and thereby only provide limited
insights into (i) more aggregate within- or between-country patterns of vari-
ation, and (ii) some of the more contextual factors that can be associated to
these patterns of variation. Mainly, if existing studies are correct in assuming
that populist potential is equally widespread within a country, we should not
be able to observe any substantial diﬀerences between communities or
regions. However, Pollock et al. (2015), for instance, indicate that – more
2Some of these studies are even more speciﬁc and argue that a populist demand translates into ‘populist
attitudes’. This would then result in an individual-level analysis of the populist demand. While we recog-
nise this is undoubtedly a relevant ﬁeld of study, neither the concept of ‘populist attitudes’, nor the indi-
vidual-level analysis of populism falls within the scope of our study.
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often than not – populist views amongst younger Europeans reﬂect local and
regional concerns. At the same time, both Taguieﬀ (1998) and Perrineau
(2014) argue that one of the reasons of the Front National’s dispersed [elec-
toral] success across France is a distinct and stable regional cleavage that cor-
responds to regional diﬀerences in far right and populist potential.
Translated to our study, we would thus expect that a general populist
demand varies depending on regional speciﬁcs. In fact, a detailed inspection
of our regional populist demand index indicates notable variation in populist
potential within some countries [cf. Appendix Table A1]. For example, the
Basque Country and Catalonia (Spain), PACA and Nord-Pas-de-Calais
(France) and the Greek islands have more populist potential than their
respective national counterparts.
To examine such contextual, yet lower-level diﬀerences, we shift our
analytical focus to the regional level and explore how regional diﬀerences
relate to the varying levels of populist demand. Our choice for the regional
level is not only pragmatic.3 After all, existing studies have already ident-
iﬁed a close interdependence between regionalist and populist ideologies
(van Kessel 2015). In some instances, the populist demand is combined
with demands for more decentralisation and regional autonomy (e.g.
Lega Nord in Italy, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Scottish National Party
in the UK). Given the shared dualistic nature of populism and regionalism
(or a regionalist interpretation of nationalism), we could even argue that
the latter serves as the host ideology to which populism can attach itself
(cf. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). The success of such actors,
most notably on the right, conﬁrms that both populist and regionalist
ideologies are likely to be self-reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive.
Therefore, the results of our study do not only contribute to the literature
on (demand-side) populism in general, but also speak to the studies that
connect regionalism to populism on the supply side. With that in mind,
we formulate four expectations regarding the regional correlates of
regional expressions of demand-side populism.
3From a theoretical perspective, one could also study demand-side populism from a local (Pollock et al.
2015) or state perspective (cf. Akkerman et al. 2014). However, politics at the regional level, esp. regional
elections, are increasingly important (Thorlakson 2016) and can even shape national politics (cf. Schakel
2013). To this extent, regions provide meaningful contexts that may shape peoples’ views. Furthermore,
as the world becomes more connected, the state - as the dominant political entity - has become less
critical (Agnew 2013). At the same time, regions closely intertwined with the state, but their relation
to the state has undergone signiﬁcant changes in the wake of these developments as evident by the
growing number of regionalist and separatist movements in Europe (Applegate 1999). Thus, regions
do constitute meaningful entities to study in particular after observing that certain populist parties,
like the Italian Lega Nord and the Vlaams Belang, began as [and to some extent still are] regionalist
parties (cf. McDonnell 2006).
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Regional patterns of variation in the populist demand
Typically, sociological accounts of populism look at legitimacy crises faced
by traditional societal actors, often brought on by economic and political
crises (Navia andWalker 2010; Oxhorn 1998; Roberts 2007; Taggart 2002;
Weyland 2006). While Rooduijn (2014) argues that economic crisis is a
crucial, even necessary, factor for the rise and success of populism,
more comprehensive accounts question this ‘essential’ component and
suggest the puzzle might be more complicated and the causal story
context-related (Kriesi and Pappas 2015).
Nonetheless, we recognise that economic scarcity and limited economic
resources can contribute to resentment or disaﬀection towards politics
and the ruling elites, with the latter being a crucial component of populism
(Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013). For example, Ford and Goodwin
(2014) ﬁnd that a sizeable populist potential translated into a UKIP vote
in both areas with higher economic deprivation (unemployment) and
working class communities. This association should mainly be present
when economic disadvantages are visible and/or relative, for example in
the form of social or economic deﬁcits or losses (Johnston et al. 2000).
This type of deprivation then reinforces the dualistic and antagonistic
relationship with the more prosperous elites. Therefore, we expect
regions that experience a lack of or declining economic opportunities to
have higher levels of populist demand.
While we theorise and recognise the importance of such relatively ‘tra-
ditional’ correlates, we also set out to examine if and how the populist
demand relates to more cultural, political and institutional features of
sub-national entities. The primary rationale for this rests on the combi-
nation of the two founding elements of populism as an ideational con-
struct, namely a horizontal feeling of belonging to ‘a people’ and a more
vertical anti-elite feeling. In general, we argue that populist demand
should be stronger in sub-national territories that display a speciﬁc
(regional) identity or set of characteristics, especially when compared
with the features of the (national) elite. After all, regional uniqueness,
much like nationalism, promotes the within and demotes the outside,
thereby advancing the dualism and antagonism that is crucial for the acti-
vation of a populist potential.
Building on this general rationale, we formulate three expectations
regarding the relationship between populism and distinctive regional
characteristics. The ﬁrst concerns the degree of regional autonomy.
Throughout Europe, decentralisation has gradually increased the role
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and importance of the regional level (Pallarés andKeating 2003;Hough and
Jeﬀery 2006; Thorlakson 2007, 2016; Swenden 2014). A strong and decen-
tralised set of regionsmay ultimately lead to region-speciﬁc and unique pol-
itical dynamics that could contribute, or even trigger, a particular socio-
political demand (Lublin 2012; Dandoy and Schakel 2013; Massetti and
Schakel 2013; Quaranta 2013), much like that for populism. Speciﬁcally,
we expect decentralisation and the resulting institutional autonomy for
the regions to not only be the result of a rejection of national politics, but
also to be related to higher levels of regional populist demand. Furthermore,
strong and independent regional institutions could enter into conﬂict with
national actors, especially if the region possesses signiﬁcant self-rule powers
(as opposed to shared rule instruments). A notable example of this rationale
is the voice and opinion expressed by Scotland after the Brexit referendum
in the UK. In short, we expect institutional autonomy to relate to regional
populist demand levels positively.
The idea of the politicisation of territorial cleavages relies in early works
on party systems (Livingston 1956; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1977;
Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Territorial cleavages are, for example, based on a
distinct regional culture, history, language, economy and ethnicity. Scho-
lars have observed that in regions with distinctive territorial identities,
regional electoral results are more likely to deviate from national election
results (Jeﬀery and Hough 2009; Dandoy and Schakel 2013). When elec-
tions are held in areas with distinctive territorial identities, voters are
more likely to disconnect themselves from the national arena and make
diﬀerent vote choices in the regional context. This is not only related to
regions being considered ‘less important’ from a political and electoral per-
spective (Reif and Schmitt 1980) but mostly stems from the belief that
regional individuality and whatever corresponding interests must be
advanced on the regional level. A distinct and unique territorial identity
serves as a clear contrasting mechanism with the national elites and
thereby emphasises the vertical component of populism. Consequently,
we expect the populist demand will be diﬀerent across regions both in
line with and because of varying unique territorial identities.
Being at the periphery of the national political system is to a large extent
related to one’s perception of being part of a distinct group, in an unequal
position compared to the elite and the establishment. This means popu-
lism incorporates the notion of ‘distance’ (Jagers and Walgrave 2007),
i.e. a close distance between oneself and his/her people but also a larger
gap between the people and the elite. We propose that this distance
may be symbolic, i.e. based on a diﬀerent culture or language, or on a
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diﬀerent way of doing politics – or simply geographic, i.e. based on the
physical location of an agent (the people) compared to the elite/s. While
this distance can be between an individual and the elite, we can also under-
stand it as the distance between a community or a region and the elite. In
other words, while we can interpret this distance as an individual com-
ponent of populist potential, we contend that it can also be part of a
more aggregated group feeling. Mainly, this latter observation suggests
that populist potential will be stronger in sub-national territories located
at the periphery and where estrangement and conﬂict between ‘the
region’ and elites are largest.
Data, instrument and method
For this study, we combine two datasets. First, we use data from a cross-
national web-based survey (n = 18368), conducted between June and
August of 2015. The dataset includes samples (n = ±2000) from nine
European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Swit-
zerland, Sweden, UK) and 143 regions.4 Drawing from these, we calculate
our indices of regional populist demand [cf. supra]. Furthermore, for our
correlates, we also rely on Eurostat’s regional databases.5
Dependent variable
We use eight items that allow us to examine populism throughout all our
regions (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88).6 The questions use Likert-scales, with
the low end indicating an aversion to populism and the higher end a
4For each country, demographic quotas were set before ﬁeldwork in order to obtain nationally represen-
tative samples. YouGov initially ﬁelded panel samples for the UK, Germany, France and Sweden, with the
remaining countries (Poland, Italy, Spain, Greece, Switzerland) being ﬁelded shortly after that by
country-speciﬁc panel providers. For these nationally representative samples, YouGov draws a sub-
sample of the panels that is representative in terms of age (adults), gender, social class and type of news-
paper (upmarket, mid-market, red-top, no newspaper), and invites this sub-sample to complete a survey.
For more detailed information regarding this active sampling strategy, we refer to Twyman (2008) and
the YouGov website. For an overview of the regions by country, including the number of individuals per
region, see Table A1 in the Online Appendix.
5We recode some of the regions since these are not fully identical between our datasets. Most notably, we
reduce the number of regions in Sweden to a limited number of ﬁve broader regions. For this particular
reason, we check the robustness of our results by excluding Sweden from all our analyses; yet, our
results remain largely the same. For more information on the regional division, we refer to Table A1
in the Online Appendix.
6For the results of a general conﬁrmatory factor analysis of our populist items, we refer to Table A3 in the
Online Appendix. A measurement invariance test (equal means) suggests our populist items have a
similar meaning across countries (Prob>chi2 = 0.000; RMSEA = 0.087; CFI = 0.950). A signiﬁcant likeli-
hood ratio test between the variant and invariant models returns a p-value < 0.001 and conﬁrms that
populism has the same model form in our nine countries under analysis. For country-by-country descrip-
tive statistics, we refer to Table A5 in the Online Appendix. For a more detailed analysis of these eight
items, using item response theory, see Van Hauwaert et al. (2018).
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propensity towards populism.7 Drawing from these items, we take a two-fold
analytical approach. First, we specify an aggregated populism index to reﬂect
the variance in the sample by region, using averaged factor scores from a
conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA).8 Second, we use these region-speciﬁc
CFA estimates to examine these patterns of variance.
Correlates
We include both short- and long-term economic development indicators.We
operationalise the former, using GDP per capita at current prices for each
region and the latter by calculating the percentage of long-term unemployed
as a share of the total working-age population.9 Concerning the degree of
institutional and political autonomy of a region, we include several indicators
originally developed by Hooghe et al. (2010) (cf. also Hooghe et al. 2016).
Their Regional Authority Index (RAI)measures the degree of regional auton-
omy according to twomain dimensions. On the one hand, self-rule indicators
comprise measures of the strength and scope of regional administrative and
political institutions, competencies, as well as ﬁscal and borrowing powers.
On the other hand, shared rule indicators concern the extent to which a
region participates in the national decision-making process via intergovern-
mental meetings and its impact on the federal legislation, revenues, borrow-
ing constraints and constitutional change.
To measure regional identity, we include two territorial identity indi-
cators, namely regional language and regional history (Fitjar 2010a,
2010b).10 The regional language index captures the importance and
peculiarity of regional languages, i.e. whether there is an indigenous
regional language that is diﬀerent from the dominant language in the
country. A historical sovereignty index measures the extent to which
the territory possesses a history of independence and if the region has
been part of the country since its formation.
Finally, we include two variables that indicate the periphery and remo-
teness of regions based on geographic criteria. The ﬁrst indicator concerns
the distance (in kilometres) between the regional capital and national
7For the exact wordings and descriptive statistics, see Table A2 in the Online Appendix.
8We recognise that CFA scores generally do not meet the aggregation criteria for necessary and suﬃcient
conditions that constitute populism (cf. Wuttke et al. 2017). The set of items available to us, however,
were not build to account for the multidimensionality that populism entails (e.g. Castanho Silva et al.
2018). Hence, we proceed here using the CFA scores.
9Long-term unemployment (more than 12 months unemployment) is preferred to the total unemploy-
ment ﬁgures as it better reﬂects the structural economic situation of the region and is not inﬂuenced
by short-term conjuncture and seasonal ﬂuctuations.
10The authors have collected scores for Poland, Switzerland and the UK regions.
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capital. The second indicator involves the distance (in kilometres) between
the regional capital and Brussels, the principal seat of the European
Union. We utilise both as proxies for the distance between a regional
population and their respective national and European elites.
In our models, we control for a series of covariates that, theoretically,
are related to both our independent as well as our dependent variable.
First, education is often considered a status marker and one of the core
strata inﬂuenced by this are the lower educated (Stubager 2013). While
some scholars see less or absence of (higher) education as an essential
indicator of far right potential (Arzheimer 2009; Bornschier 2010),
recent scholarship speciﬁes this claim by arguing lower education is par-
ticularly indicative of populist potential (Bovens and Wille 2010; Elchar-
dus and Spruyt 2016). Thus, education levels are likely to be linked to the
outcome variable. At the same time, it is easy to see how education levels
may vary with economic situations (Hanushek and Woessmann 2012;
Barro 2013) and core/periphery structures. Therefore, we include levels
of education based on the percentage of the regional population
between 25 and 64 years that reached tertiary education as a control.
Further, the growing populist potential and the widespread populist
demand are often closely associated with the cultural threat posed by
immigration (Golder 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006) and – to a lesser
extent – to the economic challenges posed by immigration (March
2011). As immigration – and hence the size of a particular out-group –
increases, it becomes easier to capture and mobilise the rejection
(blame) of a particular elite, either from an economic or a nationalist
rationale. Thus, immigration levels may be related to the outcome vari-
able, but also core/periphery and economy variables. We account for
immigration levels through the share of foreign-born residents in a
given region.11
Closely related to both immigration concentration and economic devel-
opment is the crime rate (Rosenfeld and Messner 2009). At the same time,
crime also relates to the populist demand, as it could account for varying
dis/aﬀection with politics and elites. Therefore we include the number of
burglaries per capita for each region. Finally, we include region-speciﬁc
variables and control for the size of the region (square kilometres) and
11While our indicator (based on the proportion of the total population with a country of birth diﬀerent
from the current country of residence) does not take into account migrants from the second and
third generations and considers national citizens born abroad as part of this share of population, we
believe it to be a good proxy to assess the variation of immigrants in the structure of the regional
population.
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the regional population to account for the overall magnitude of the
region.12
Method
To explore the relationship between our regional level variables and the
regional expression of populist potential in our sample, we initially rely
on more descriptive methods, but subsequently, we also ﬁt a multivariate
OLS model. We ﬁt two diﬀerent models, one excluding the controls and
one including the controls.13 However, we should stress the explorative
intentions of our models. Rather than looking to draw major inferential
claims from our results, our goal is to detect potential relationships
between regional factors and a changing populist demand that future
studies can then explore in more detail and with more inferentially-
oriented methods.
Empirical insights into the regional populist demand
As a ﬁrst step, Figure 1 shows the variance of populist demand in our
sample between regions graphically. While we can observe a relatively per-
vasive populist demand in our sample, there is also considerable variation
within each country.
Figure 1 indicates that within-country distributions vary to a certain
extent. On the one hand, regional populist demand in the UK, Sweden
and Greece is narrowly distributed across our sample, while in other
countries – and particularly Italy and Switzerland – the regional popu-
list demand varies much more. What strikes as interesting here is the
strong territorial cleavage structure of these two latter countries. If
there is genuinely a close connection between regionalism and popu-
lism, it is entirely possible that a broader range amongst regional vari-
ables (such as the RAI) is also responsible for the regional dispersion in
12For descriptive statistics of all covariates, see Table A4 in the Online Appendix. For descriptive statistics of
our dependent variable by country, see Table A5 in the Online Appendix.
13Because we only focus on the regional level, no hierarchical structure permit for more advanced mod-
elling techniques. This is particularly the case because our data set only includes nine countries, thereby
rendering multi-level modelling highly problematic (cf. Stegmueller 2013). However, we do take into
account the possibility that there may be systematic country diﬀerences in our analyses by also ﬁtting a
model with country ﬁxed eﬀects (cf. Table A7 in the Online Appendix). Both models provide us with
similar substantive results, thereby indicating the robustness of our results. To further test the robust-
ness of our results, we also provide an analysis with individual-level correlates, using a ﬁxed-eﬀects
model. In this model, we test how, on the individual level, respondents’ populism demand varies by
regional factors identiﬁed to relate to general populism demand. For the results of this model, we
refer to Table A8 in the Online Appendix. Furthermore, we provide bootstrapped statistics (cf. Table
A6 in the Online Appendix) from 1,000 randomly drawn samples to take into account potential outliers.
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populist potential in Italy (between North and South) and Switzerland
(between Zurich, Bern and the more rural cantons). Altogether, this
strengthens our rationale to investigate aggregate levels of populist
demand, mainly to understand the overall patterns in the data that
underlie this observation, as well as the nuances in how populist poten-
tial diﬀers and spreads between regions.
We use these patterns of variance to provide a more comprehensive
analysis of the regional populist demand and its correlates. In Table 1,
we present the results from our OLS models. Overall, these results align
with some of our initial theorisations about some of the correlates of
regional populist demand (models 1 and 2). In what follows, we brieﬂy
reﬂect upon our empirical results.
Considering economic development ﬁrst, we ﬁnd that higher levels of
regional unemployment relate to higher levels of populist demand in
our data. Also, higher levels of regional GDP/capita relate to lower
levels of populist demand in the examined regions. Both ﬁndings match
the theoretical expectation and indicate that fewer economic opportunities
in a region, as well as what can perhaps be construed as economic decline,
is associated with higher levels of regional populist demand.
Figure 1. Distribution of populist demand by region and country.
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Regarding regional autonomy, we expected higher levels of auton-
omy to be related to higher levels of populist demand. From model 1,
we observe that the degree of institutional autonomy of a region is
related to levels of demand-side populism: High levels of self-rule (i.e.
strong institutions competencies and ﬁscal powers) relate to greater
populist demand. In contrast, however, shared rule (i.e. the extent to
which a region participates in the national decision-making process)
is signiﬁcant and negatively related to regional populism. We can inter-
pret this as a region-based counterweight to the dominance of the elite
and the establishment. Via shared-rule mechanisms, citizens may per-
ceive they have a direct say in the national political arena. We note
Table 1. Factors related to regional populist demand.
Dependent variable:
Populist Demand
(1) (2)
Unemployment 0.023***
(0.006)
0.030***
(0.006)
Economy (GDP/capita) −0.047***
(0.010)
−0.027*
(0.014)
Selfrule 0.024***
(0.009)
0.0003
(0.011)
Sharedrule −0.027***
(0.006)
−0.022***
(0.007)
Distance – Capital 0.0003***
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
Distance – Brussels −0.0001*
(0.0001)
−0.0001*
(0.0001)
Identity (Language) 0.062***
(0.022)
0.070***
(0.022)
Identity (Sovereignty) 0.011
(0.027)
0.034
(0.028)
Education −0.008***
(0.003)
Share of Foreigners 0.005
(0.005)
Region Size −0.00000
(0.00000)
Population −0.000
(0.000)
Burglary/capita −0.003**
(0.001)
Constant −0.123
(0.085)
0.362**
(0.163)
Observations 143 143
R2 0.556 0.604
Adjusted R2 0.530 0.564
Residual Std. Error 0.207 (df = 134) 0.199 (df = 129)
F Statistic 20.977*** (df = 8; 134) 15.123*** (df = 13; 129)
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses; Results come from OLS Regression Models – model 1 without con-
trols. For bootstrapped statistics for model 2, see Table A.6.
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that in model 2, the indicator for the degree of institutional autonomy
(self-rule) appears to be no longer related to regional populist demand
in the sample when taking into account other correlates.
In general, the rejection of the elites, regardless of their form and com-
position, is a crucial component of populism. Since the most typical embo-
diments of those elites are the national political class and the EU, we
expected that regions further away from their country capital or Brussels
should display higher levels of populist demand. Our results in Table 1
indicate this holds for both distances to the national and European capi-
tals, as both are associated with higher regional levels of populism. The
further a region is located from the national or European capital, the
higher its populist potential in our data. Given how we theorised these dis-
tances to indicate a certain disconnect to domestic (European) politics and
national (European) elites, we thus argue that as this proposed gap
between people and elites increases, quite unsurprisingly, regional levels
of populism also increase.
Finally, we also expected that culturally distinct regions would be more
prone to be associated with higher levels of populist demand. The results
in Table 1 remain somewhat ambiguous regarding this expectation. A
region with a clear regional language displays higher levels of regional
populism. This is in line with our initial expectation that the feeling of
being distant from, and dominated by, national elite reinforces the case
of diﬀerent languages at the regional and national levels. In contrast,
regional history does not appear to be meaningfully related to populist
demand on the regional level. We would suggest this is the case because
history draws from a (very) long-term cultural identity. Thus, it is prob-
ably less appealing than more particular distinctive cultural elements,
such as the regional language.
Lastly, we brieﬂy look at some of the additional correlates we included
in our second model. Here, we observe that only the level of education
relates meaningfully to our regional-level operationalisation of the popu-
list demand. Such an observation does not surprise us, given that initial
studies demonstrate that populism is typically a phenomenon most pro-
minent amongst lower educated layers of the population (cf. Elchardus
and Spruyt 2016). Moreover, thus far education is one of the few predic-
tors of populism scholars can ﬁnd agreement on, and our analysis mainly
supports such academic convergence. Additionally, while most scholars
agree on its individual-level value, we further conﬁrm its more aggregate
value as well. Overall, we conclude that lower levels of education are
associated with higher levels of populism, which indicates that regions
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where levels of tertiary education are lower (e.g. rural regions), there is
typically more populist potential. This also means that, despite having
both indicators for education and economic inequalities in our analysis
(two concepts that are often in concert with one another), we still ﬁnd sig-
niﬁcant and independent eﬀects on regional levels of populism. All other
controls are statistically insigniﬁcant.14
Discussion and conclusion
Most academic research focuses on the supply-side analysis of populism
(parties, movements, leaders, governments, democracy, etc.). While
some recent studies do engage in complementary analyses of the
demand-side of populism, they primarily focus on individual-level mech-
anisms and measurement. Whereas most of these studies draw from the
individual level to argue that populism is typically pervasive and shows
elevated levels across (advanced) democracies, we shift our focus to an
aggregate level analysis and set out to examine to what extent we can
observe potential patterns of variance in populist potential both within-
and between countries across Europe. This kind of aggregate but explora-
tory study of demand-side populism and its intricate patterns of variance
is unique and new to the ﬁeld. We draw from some of the initial theoris-
ations that discuss broader patterns of populism to examine and provide a
ﬁrst exploratory account of how and why the populist demand may vary
across European regions and which factors are most typically related to
such patterns of variance.
The general conclusion from our empirical analyses is that the aggre-
gate populist demand (measured as a regional phenomenon) is relatively
stable across regions in the data used here. While we do ﬁnd some prelimi-
nary indications of similarities and diﬀerences in populist potential
between and within countries, the broader range of populist potential
remains relatively limited, with few to no outliers. At the same time,
however, we observed enough variation between regions in our sample
to wonder how populist potential relates to other variables or phenomena.
An initial OLS model provides some preliminary evidence that populism
has some unique regional-level correlates that we can observe across Euro-
pean regions and countries. Our ﬁndings also suggest that traditional cor-
relates of populism are very much at play on the regional level. Speciﬁcally,
14Since some studies indicate that immigration is only associated to (right-wing) populism in the case of
economic hardship (e.g. Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2003), we also tested for the interaction between
immigration and economic indicators, but substantive results remained identical.
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both long- and short-term proxies of economic development indicate that
a deteriorating economic environment is favourable for a region’s populist
potential. We also ﬁnd that when regional identities are stronger and more
outspoken, the populist potential is more likely to be high. In line with
this, we also ﬁnd evidence that when regions are located further away
from both national and European capitals, a populist potential is more
elevated.
In sum, the analyses we provided throughout this study should receive
proper consideration upon interpretation. The resulting arguments and
ﬁndings are the ﬁrst step towards a more comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between the aggregate populist demand and its explanatory
mechanisms. This study is the ﬁrst of that kind and seeks to open up
new avenues of research into this unexplored puzzle. For example, we
can speak to the fact that many populist parties draw from speciﬁc
regions for their support (e.g. Lega Nord in Northern Italy, Vlaams
Belang in Antwerp, Die Linke in Eastern Germany, etc.). Future research
that elaborates on the relationship between aggregate populist potential
and diﬀerent expressions of political participation may thus consider that
due to an essential regional component of the populist demand, it may
play a greater role in some regions as opposed to others. Furthermore, sub-
sequent studies may test the extent to which the regional-level variables that
we identiﬁed as correlates of regional populist demand also shape individ-
ual-level interpretations of the populism demand, i.e. populist attitudes. In
other words, future research should examine to what extent the regional
context also matters for the individual level of populist demand.
The results of our study bear implications for (i) those who examine the
causes of populism and its potential on the individual level, and (ii) those
who consider populism to be a contributor of political behaviour, particu-
larly in the form of voting or general political participation. To explain the
observed variation, we drew on existing arguments for the national level
from the populism literature (economic development), as well as new
explanations from regional studies (e.g. regional identity). While we can
provide some general insights into the empirical puzzle of populism,
our study clearly shows some essential avenues for more in-depth analysis.
Most importantly, our notion of geographical distance proved to be an
important one, but it leaves unstudied other interpretations of ‘distance’,
like cultural, symbolic and education and socio-economic. Perhaps more
generally, seeing how we can highlight some explanatory mechanisms, we
believe it is essential to increase our attention to the regional level of
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analysis, especially since we shift our future attention to the value of pol-
itical mechanisms (e.g. cleavages) that might underlie populism.
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